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PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

A Lecture Delivered in the Intelligence Orientation Course

by

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25X1A first entered upon intelligence work in 1943 with the Office of Strategic Services. As a research analyst and geographer he studied the climate of the invasion area of Europe and transportation systems in the Far East. After several years of university teaching, he joined CIA as an analyst in the Office of Research and Reports where land transportation within the Soviet Bloc was his particular responsibility. Since 1957, he has been a member of the Intelligence Production Faculty of the Intelligence School, OTR. During his years of service in war and peace, he has had the opportunity to observe practically the whole growth of the concept of national intelligence.

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Introduction: Production of Intelligence

The production of intelligence involves something like alchemy in its process. The analyst takes his carefully selected and winnowed information, subjects it to several purifying and fiery trials (analysis and interpretation) and finally effects a transmutation into a new product—finished intelligence. In national intelligence, the analogy is even more exact: this type of finished intelligence is the result of the blending of a wide variety of original materials, each chosen and massed with others for its relevance to the final product. All finished intelligence, then, stems from information previously gathered and assembled.

Looked at from another angle, finished intelligence is the result of the work of many minds and many men. An intelligence organization is quasi-military. For every man on the firing line—for the man, that is, who is producing finished intelligence—there must be a large number working directly or indirectly in his support: those who collect the intelligence information around the globe, those who assemble, grade, and store it, and those who carry out the more mundane tasks of supply, finance, and housekeeping.

This lecture, a general one introducing the whole process of production, stresses this pyramid of production, explains the various steps taken toward the final product and discusses a typical exercise in assessment of potential.

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Coordination

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SUMMARY

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PRODUCTI	ON OF INTELL	IGENCE
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This lecture introduces the second phase in the intelligence production cycle or process: the production of intelligence—specifically of finished intelligence. Production of finished intelligence results from research that utilizes intelligence information. It usually takes the form of published reports, although it may also consist of briefings. The third phase is dissemination of finished intelligence to potential users which will be discussed later. The fourth phase is the use of finished intelligence for policy or operations. The cycle is frequently repeated when either producer or user reviews requirements for the collection of additional intelligence information. These requests for collection are often based on gaps found in the finished intelligence.

CLASSIFICATION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE

Both finished intelligence and intelligence-information can be classified in terms of subject matter: for example, geographic intelligence, economic intelligence, and military intelligence. Both can also be classified in terms of the time period involved, as

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historical intelligence, current intelligence, or future intelligence.

Frequently a report will include two or more time periods. Basic intelligence, a species of encyclopedic information with widespread use in the intelligence community for reference purposes, is primarily historical.

The classification which will be used in this lecture, however, is in terms of the use of intelligence, which also may involve the mode of production. This classification applies only to finished intelligence. The categories are not mutually exclusive but overlap somewhat. One category is departmental intelligence which is intelligence produced and used by a department to execute its mission. Secondly, there is interdepartmental intelligence which is finished intelligence produced by two or more intelligence agencies and which may be used in support of joint responsibilities. Under this category is a special type called joint intelligence which is produced within the Department of Defense by two or all three of the Armed Services primarily for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The third category in terms of use is national intelligence. This is integrated departmental intelligence and the main criterion is that it is coordinated or agreed intelligence. It may include dissents of one or more of the agencies participating. In terms of use, national intelligence is generally for policy-making and operational planning at the high levels of government.

PHILOSOPHY AND PURPOSE OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE

Finished intelligence in general deals with the capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions, and possible courses of action of foreign countries. The stress in finished intelligence is primarily on

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potential enemies of this country, and it views subjects related to these countries in terms of their possible effects on either the U. S. or its friends. The ultimate use of finished intelligence is by the various levels in our government which plan operations or determine policy. In this respect, intelligence research differs from academic research in that it is intended to be used—in planning of policy and operations.

THE INTELLIGENCE PYRAMID

The method whereby finished intelligence is produced and used may be diagrammed in the form of a pyramid. (See diagram) The purpose of this diagram is to indicate that each level or layer in the intelligence community supports all other layers above it. At the top are the primary users of national intelligence, the President and the National Security Council.

Support Elements

At the base are the intelligence support elements within and outside CIA. These include personnel and finance officers, editors, IBM machine operators, and reading panels.

Intelligence Information Collectors

At the next level in the pyramid are the intelligence information collectors. Within CIA this level includes the DD/P for collection by clandestine means; OCR Liaison and Collection Division, which collects in Washington from U. S. Government officials, primarily in the non-USIB agencies; and the

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	At this level is the Photographic Intelligence
	Center, which exploits primarily air photography for intelligence infor-
25X1B	mation. could also be shown as a collector
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	In Defense and State Department, collection is done primarily by the

In Defense and State Department, collection is done primarily by the Armed Services and departmental attaches and by the foreign service officers.

Repositories of Intelligence

The next level in the pyramid is the repositories of intelligence information, as well as of finished intelligence. An important repository which is frequently forgotten is the intelligence analysts own files. These files may be the best single repositories of information in the United States, and perhaps in the world, on the subjects in which the analysts specialize. In CIA, there is, in addition, the OCR Library, the several registers, and the ORR Map Library. State and Defense Department also have intelligence repositories.

Intelligence Research

At the next level is the production of finished intelligence based on research, utilizing the support that has been provided by each of the levels below. Within CIA the major producers of finished intelligence

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are the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Office of Research and Reports. The Office of Current Intelligence also produces some longer term studies but its main product is quick assessments of current situations. Within Defense and State Departments there are also offices for production of finished intelligence based on research.

Production of National and Interdepartmental Intelligence

The culmination of this entire effort is the production of finished national and interdepartmental intelligence. Within CIA the Office of National Estimates is at this level. The new OCI daily might also be included at this level because the items in it are published after interagency agreement has been achieved. The various USIB committees also produce interdepartmental intelligence. These include particularly the Economic Intelligence Committee, the Scientific Intelligence Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee. If the product of these USIB committees is agreed to by the USIB, it becomes national intelligence. Another producer of interdepartmental intelligence is J-2 within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These producers of interdepartmental and national intelligence do not normally do basic research work. Basic research is done and contributions are written in OSI and ORR and in the various research branches outside CIA. The contributions are then submitted to these producers which merge them into national and interdepartmental studies.

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THE ORIGIN OF RESEARCH TOPICS

Requested Research

The research studies on which the analyst works may be requested by individuals or organizations outside the research office. Requests may be two types: ad hoc or one time requests, and periodic requests, which may recur annually or semi-annually, depending upon need. Major requestors include the National Security Council, which may see the need for facts on which to base policy decisions. The Director of Central Intelligence may receive a high-level request for certain types of information or may think of studies which he needs. The Office of National Estimates transmits requests from the National Security Council and also asks for periodic revision of existing National Intelligence Estimates. The various USIB committees originate needed studies in their special fields. The Office of Basic Intelligence has a schedule for the production of new or revised chapters for the National Intelligence Survey. The DD/P makes requests for various types of support on operations.

Self-Initiated Research

Topics which are initiated within the research office are generally based on a need to fill gaps in intelligence. The analyst may originate projects on the basis of his specialized knowledge of gaps that exist in his field. Often these gaps are based on post-mortems of recently produced National Intelligence Estimates. Self-initiated studies frequently anticipate the type of information needed for a forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate by studying the effects of some recent development, such as a recent scientific advance in the U.S.S.R.

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Examples of Research Topics

As examples of the origin of demand for research, following is a brief discussion of a related series of finished intelligence studies, most of which had a direct or indirect effect on U. S. policy.

Capability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad: An interdepartmental study of the capability of the Trans-Siberian railroad and connecting lines into China was published by the Economic Intelligence Committee of the USIB (then IAC) as EIC-R9. The Economic Intelligence Committee has a number of specialized subcommittees, one of which is the Transportation Subcommittee. This subcommittee is composed of representatives of the various government agencies which do research on foreign transportation. It, therefore, includes not only intelligence community representatives but also representatives from Department of Commerce and Maritime Commission. In 1952, the CIA member pointed out the need for a joint study of the capability of the Trans-Siberian railroad and connecting lines into China. At that time there was no agreed estimate; in fact, each agency had its own estimate and none of them agreed with the others.

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Siberian railroad is the single most important railroad in the world, for on this slender thread is suspended practically all of Soviet Far East policy. By contrast with the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian railroad, the airlines connecting European U.S.S.R. with the Far East and the Northern Sea Route, which operates only in summer, have a very small carrying capacity. The Transportation Subcommittee set up a working group made up of members from CIA, Army, Air Force, and State

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	Department. The CIA member agreed to do the research work and to write
•	the draft report which would then be considered by the working group. At
•	the time this work was completed the Chief of the U.S.S.R. section of the
25X1B	One result of his
25X1C	visit was agreement on this capability study. This,
	then, was a study initiated by a specialized subcommittee in the USIB
	structure on the basis of the suggestion of an individual member.
	Communist China's Foreign Trade: At about the same time
	Truman and Prime Minister Churchill discussed the trade in strategic
	materials from the Free World to Communist China, and the possibility of
	blockading China as a result of the Korean War. They found, however, that
	their figures on China's trade differed greatly. To achieve some agree-
•	ment on the level and nature of this trade, the Director of Central In-
25X1C	telligence was asked to study of this
	problem. The USIB (then IAC) submitted a request to the Economic In-
	telligence Committee, which transmitted it to the Transportation Sub-
	committee. This subcommittee set up another working group to produce
25X1C	a study containing agreed figures on the trade of China.
	The resultant study is EIC-Rl, Communist China's Imports and Exports,
	Trade and Transport Involved. This study has been produced annually for
	six years. This, then, was a study which had been requested by the
	President.
	Effect of a Blockade of China: The third related study is one on
•	the possible effects of a blockade of Communist China. In early 1952,

the National Security Council requested a special estimate on the

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probable effects of various courses of action against Communist China. In early 1953, it requested another special estimate on the probable effects on the Soviet Bloc of action directed at the commerce of Communist China; in other words, a blockade. This second special estimate drew on the drafts of the two studies mentioned above. It used agreed figures on the amount of traffic carried to China from EIC-Rl and compared these tonnages with the capability of the Trans-Siberian railroad and connecting lines into China, taken from EIC-R9. It concluded that the estimated capability of inland transport facilities serving Communist China was probably adequate to carry essential tonnage then seaborne, plus essential traffic then carried by land. This study, which was requested specifically by the National Security Council, undoubtedly played a major role in the U. S. decision not to blockade the coast of China which had been under consideration for some time.

Methodology for Computing Railroad Capability: Another related study was a methodology for computing the capability of railroad lines. When work was completed on the study of Trans-Siberian capability, one of the conclusions reached was that an agreed methodology should be developed. A working group was set up and developed a methodology which was approved for testing. This study was done as a result of the statement of gaps in a report.

Freight Traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railroad: At about the same time the Transportation Branch in ORR realized that one of the means whereby one could check an estimate on the capability of a railroad line would be to find out how much traffic was moving. Obviously, if the

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•	capability of a railroad line was estimated to be 20,000 tons each way pe	r
	day and the railroad was actually handling much more than 20,000 tons,	
•	then there is something wrong with the methodology used for calculating	
	capability. An ORR analyst worked for a period of several years on the	
	volume and character of traffic on the Trans-Siberian railroad. The re-	
	sult was a truly monumental study	25X1D
253445		20/(10
25X1D	It was published as CIA/RR82	
	in November 1956. This study was self-initiated within the research bran	nch
	Re-estimate of Trans-Siberian Capability: In 1956, the Army request	ed
	that a re-estimate be made of the capability of the Trans-Siberian rail-	
	road because an agreed methodology was available and much new information	ı
	had been received on the railroad	25X1B
25X1B	An inter-agency working group was established	1
	in the Pentagon. When it completed its work, the CIA member found himse	Lf
	in disagreement with the conclusions because on the Omsk to Novosibirsk	
	section, which has the heaviest traffic, the capability was estimated to	
	be about one-half of the actual traffic as shown in the CIA traffic study	7.
	The Army finally published the paper on capability of the Trans-Siberian	
	railroad using figures which the Defense Department members agreed to.	
	Within recent months, however, the Defense Department has come to agree	
	with the actual traffic movement figures published in the CIA report so	•

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is restudying the methodology to find out what is wrong with it.

that the Army report is no longer valid. At present another working group

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FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION OUTSIDE CIA

In intelligence research offices outside of CIA there is a large commitment of manpower to the writing of basic intelligence, primarily of chapters for the National Intelligence Survey. In addition, of course, there is departmental intelligence produced in support of the operations of the agency involved. In some subject fields these agencies are increasingly calling on ORR and OSI to produce studies to supply departmental needs. Departmental intelligence production includes classified periodicals such as the Army's Intelligence Review. There is also a small effort in interdepartmental and joint intelligence production. It includes work done for J-2 in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and for the various USIB sub-committees. Finally, these agencies also write some contributions to national intelligence, particularly for National Intelligence Estimates.

Following is a brief discussion of the major producers of finished intelligence outside CIA.

J-2 in Joint Chiefs of Staff

J-2 is the intelligence producing group under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its product is primarily estimative intelligence dealing with capabilities of potential enemies. These studies are based primarily on contributions received from the intelligence organizations of the Armed Services.

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Army

Within the Army the major producer of finished intelligence is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, formerly G-2. ACSI may receive contributions from the various intelligence units of the Technical Services, such as the Army Signal Intelligence Agency, the Transportation Intelligence Agency, and the Engineers Strategic Intelligence Division. The overseas commands of the Army also put out some finished intelligence studies.

Navy

Within the Navy the major producer is the Office of Naval Intelligence and its major product is port studies.

Air Force

The Air Force's major producer of finished intelligence is the Air Force Chief of Intelligence, or A-2. It has overseas commands which also put out finished intelligence studies.

State Department

Within State Department the major producer is the Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis. Its products are primarily on political subjects, but sometimes deal with non-Bloc economic matters.

Other Agencies

There are other producers of finished intelligence studies outside the intelligence community. The Departments of Commerce, Interior, and Agriculture all have units producing chapters for the National Intelligence

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Survey.

PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE WITHIN CIA

Within CIA, there are a number of producers of finished intelligence or of studies between the level of intelligence information and finished intelligence, such as research aids.

Production by Repositories

	There is some production by divisions which are primarily reposi-	
	tories. Industrial Register, for example, produces studies of indivi-	
	dual plants or products on request.	25X1B
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•	Production by a Collector	
	There is also some production by a division which is primarily a	
STATSPEC	collector. produces studies on	
STATSPEC	trends nd also ST	ATSPEC
	specific topics.	

Production by a Support Staff

There is also production by a staff which is primarily a support staff for operations. The Counterintelligence Staff of DD/P produces some studies of other intelligence services. They also produce Section

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In the DD/P there are a number of other staffs and branches which do research in a support capacity.

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Production by an Administrative Office

The Office of Basic Intelligence has administrative and editorial functions in the production of the National Intelligence Survey. It gets contributions of chapters primarily from intelligence agencies. Little if any basic research and writing on the basis of intelligence information is done in OBI.

Production by Major Producers

The production of finished intelligence in CIA by offices whose primary activity is the writing of finished intelligence reports takes place in four offices: Current Intelligence, Research and Reports, Scientific Intelligence, and National Estimates.

Office of Current Intelligence: OCI produces the Current Intelligence Daily and Weekly. These periodicals are based primarily on quick analyses of situations. There is rarely time for thorough research, although OCI does produce some spot studies for other purposes that are based on longer term research.

Office of Scientific Intelligence and Office of Research and Reports
The Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Office of Research and
Reports are the primary producers of finished intelligence in CIA
based on long term research. Their area of responsibility is primarily
the Soviet Bloc. Within OSI the subject responsibility is scientific
and technical achievements and capabilities, and in ORR the responsibility is economic status and capabilities of a country and the
geographic description of a country or parts of a country.

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These two offices produce several types of finished intelligence studies. First of all, they produce basic intelligence. They each have responsibility for the production of certain chapters in the National Intelligence Survey. Secondly, they produce a number of types of current intelligence. Both offices write items for the OCI Daily and Weekly. OSI also produces its own Scientific Intelligence Digest, which appears twice a month. Within ORR the equivalent publication is the Current Support Memorandum. However, this is not a periodic item, and covers only one subject. One of these memoranda is produced when an analyst finds an item which seems to have current support value. Thirdly, these offices produce departmental intelligence. Some studies are done in support of DD/P on specific request. In addition, they produce atudies in fulfillment of their own mission. Fourthly, these offices produce contributions to interdepartmental intelligence. This consists primarily of studies done for the various USIB committees and sub-committees. Finally, these offices produce contributions to national intelligence. They write the scientific and economic contributions to National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates dealing particularly with the Bloc.

Office of National Estimates: The fourth CIA office whose primary activity is the writing of finished intelligence reports is the Office of National Estimates, which produces the draft for National Intelligence Estimates. The drafts are then considered by various groups and are finally approved by the USIB.

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STEPS IN PRODUCING FINISHED INTELLIGENCE

The major stress in the remainder of this paper will be on the methods of producing finished intelligence as it is done primarily in ORR and OSI.

The Planning of Research: The first step in this production is the planning of research, and the first phase in planning is the origination of the research topic itself. On requested research projects the individual who requests the project normally does this part of planning, but with self-initiated research the analyst or one of his supervisors determines the subject or topic to be studied.

The second step normally is the writing of the terms of reference.

This is a major planning tool which consists of a title, a statement of problem, and either an outline or a list of questions which define the scope of the project. A terms of reference may include a number of other items such as deadlines, man-hours, and the name of the responsible analyst. On research requested by the Office of National Estimates for a National Intelligence Estimate, and by the USIB sub-committees, the terms of reference normally accompany the request. Requests from others, however, may be received by word of mouth. In this case the analyst or his supervisor may write the terms of reference. On self-initiated research, whoever originates the project generally writes the terms of reference.

The third planning tool is the project work schedule. The wellorganized analyst will normally schedule the work that he is going to
do. This schedule helps him finish his work within the deadline which

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has been set and also acts as a check list so that he will do all the things necessary to turn out a finished intelligence study.

The Assembly of Data: Having completed the greater part of the project planning the analyst begins the active assembly of data for the project. The analyst has a number of major repositories of information to draw on, some of which he actively builds up as well.

The Analyst's Expertise: The analyst has his own fund of specialized knowledge to draw upon as well as to build up. Many analysts come into CIA lacking knowledge in one or more major aspects of their work. An economist who is put to work writing economic analyses of the Soviet steel industry at first may not know where the Donets Basin is, much less where some of the more obscure steel producing centers are located. So the analyst must train himself, and also take advantage of courses in the Office of Training. The Agency is among the best in providing training for its analysts to build up and to maintain their expertness in their own field.

The Inbox: The analyst also has the inbox, which is the Agency's means of spoon feeding pertinent information to the analyst. Whether or not the inbox contains information which the analyst can use depends on the reading requirements which he has submitted to OCR Document Division. Document Division is the funnel through which practically all documents come into the Agency and are then routed to the individual analyst. These reading requirements are an important means of reducing the amount of extraneous material in the analyst's inbox and of increasing the value of the material which he gets.

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The Analyst's Files: Selected material received through the inbox is incorporated in his files, and after a period of time the analyst may have files on his particular specialty and area that are second to none. When the analyst begins work on a project, he first reviews his files to determine whether he has enough information on each of the subjects to be covered in the project. He also consults with other specialists ("opposite numbers") inside and outside the Agency who work on the same or similar subjects, and utilizes their files.

Libraries and Registers: The analyst also checks with the various libraries and registers both within and outside the Agency to determine whether they have information which he does not have in his files. However, if he has a short deadline, he may find that his files have more information than he can exploit fully in the time available. If he has kept good files, he checks the various libraries and registers primarily to determine whether they contain anything which is not in his files. He usually finds a few items, some of which may be of considerable value, which did not get into his inbox, although they should have.

On the other hand, if he has been collecting on his subject for some period of time, he will also find that his file has far more information than he will find in readily available form in any of the repositories. The reason is that a number of the major sources of intelligence information are difficult to recover from repositories. For example, after one year cables are not available in Cable Center. The individual items in _______ are not indexed in a central place. The analyst must therefore go through _______ regularly to tear out individual

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pages and file them. Similarly, the FDD <u>Summaries</u> contain many small items gleaned from Soviet newspapers and magazines which are not indexed in the Intellofax system. So these must also generally be read and filed on a current basis. The statement is frequently made that an average of about 90 percent of the information in finished intelligence reports is from open sources. Open sources consist primarily of these radio broadcasts and translations from newspapers and magazines, most of which cannot normally be recovered from either the library or the registers. Nonetheless, CIA Library is by far the best intelligence repository in the Washington area, if not the world, and is getting better all along. The best evidence for this statement is the fact that it is being used increasingly by the Armed Services and State Department, because there is more material, in more readily available form, than in their own libraries.

The analyst also uses the Map Library in ORR and the photo files in Graphics Register, air photos in Photographic Intelligence Center,

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also has an abundance of specialized libraries, in addition to the Library of Congress. Many of the national associations that have head-quarters in Washington have some sort of library. The subjects covered by these libraries range from homeopathic medicine to paints and varnishes. On our Trans-Siberian study we made extensive use of the Association of American Railroads library, from which we obtained information on operating practices in areas with very cold winters, such as Canada and Alaska. This analogical research was necessary because information was not available on winter operations on the Trans-Siberian railroad.

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Collection Organizations: Having made these checks, the analyst may find he has little or no information on some portions of his project. He is now in a position to write requirements for collection of intelligence information to fill these gaps. It would be tremendously wasteful if he were to submit requirements for collection of information which was in his files, the files of his opposite numbers, or in the libraries and registers. Through the collection requirements which he writes, the analyst can call not only on CIA collectors, but also on the collectors for other U. S. and friendly intelligence services.

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The Analysis of Data and Writing of the Report

Having collected information for a project, the analyst must process his material and write a finished intelligence report. This stage is similar to writing a research paper in college; however, there are some significant differences. For one thing, in intelligence research the analyst generally knows he is writing something that is going to be used, whereas many pure researchers in the academic world are disinterested in anything that has immediate usefulness.

Coordination

When the analyst has finished writing his report, the final processing must be performed. One important step at this stage is coordination. Coordination simply means having your paper checked by analysts who are expert in the subjects dealt with in the paper. This may have considerable value because these experts often find mistakes that no one else could catch. Occasionally, they have information that the analyst didn't happen to have. And, finally, their interpretation of the facts may differ from the analyst's and, in some cases, may be better.

Within the Agency, coordination is required, because finished intelligence reports represent the best views of the Agency. Both OSI and ORR reports include a statement that the report represents the best judgment of the Office; thus, after it has been coordinated, the report is no longer the best judgment of the analyst alone. External coordination is not required for Agency reports, but it is often done on an informal basis if the analyst has a competent opposite number in another Agency.

Editing

The editing, which takes place before a report is published, is a further means of making it an Agency product. Editors check manuscripts to make them conform to the office's format and style and to be sure it is written in language appropriate for those who will read and use it. The checking of maps, graphics, and proofs or multilith masters must be done before the report can be reproduced.

Dissemination

The analyst may be asked to aid in establishing the dissemination
list for his report. Most published reports are given a standard
dissemination within the intelligence community.

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POST-MORTEM

The final step in the production of a report may be the post-mortem. For example, ORR requires that each report have an annex on gaps in intelligence which were discovered as a result of the research on that report. The analyst is then duty bound to take action on filling the gaps which he discovered. Following the publication of National Intelligence Estimates a post-mortem is prepared and published separately. This post-mortem discusses the major gaps in intelligence and the things that ought to be done the next time the NIE is produced. This post-mortem is in a sense also a collection guide, because in various parts of the Agency it is looked upon as one of the most current indicators

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of vital gaps in intelligence. As indicated earlier, the post-mortem on our study of the Trans-Siberian railroad showed the need for a considerable amount of information. It also pointed out the need for a methodology to improve calculations of railroad capability and predicted the need for an early revision of the estimate when more information became available and when the methodology had been approved. These recommendations were carried out.

SUMMARY

In summary, this lecture has introduced the production of finished intelligence. It reviewed the various ways of classifying finished intelligence and summarized the philosophy or purpose of finished intelligence. The intelligence pyramid was introduced to show the interdependence of all levels in the intelligence community in the production and use of finished intelligence. The origin of demand for these studies was discussed, using as specific illustrations a group of studies related to the Trans-Siberian railroad and the China blockade question. The types of finished intelligence produced both outside and within CIA were described, and steps in the production of finished intelligence were discussed. These steps are the planning of the research, the assembly of data, analysis and the writing of the report, and the final processing of the report.